

Software Engineering and Service-Oriented Systems

– Analysing Service-Oriented Systems with COWS –

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In co-operation with SENSORIA members, in particular Alessandro Fantechi, Stefania Gnesi, Alessandro Lapadula, Franco Mazzanti, and Rosario Pugliese

Analysis techniques for COWS specifications

- A bisimulation-based observational semantics [ICALP'09]
- A type system for checking confidentiality properties [FSEN'07]
- A logical verification methodology [FASE'08, TOSEM'12]


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- **A logical verification methodology [FASE'08,TOSEM'12]**

Logics and Model checking

- Process calculi provide behavioral specifications of services
- Logics have been long since proved able to reason about such complex systems as SOC applications
 - ▶ provide abstract specifications of these complex systems
 - ▶ can be used for describing system properties rather than system behaviors
- Logics and model checkers can be used as tools for verifying that services enjoy desirable properties and do not manifest unexpected behaviors

A logical verification methodology



Requirements formalisation

To formally express service properties we exploit

SocL

an action- and state-based, branching time, temporal logic expressly designed to formalise in a convenient way distinctive aspects of services

action- and state-based logic



Doubly Labelled Transition Systems (L^2TS) as interpretation domain



Abstract notion of services

- services are thought of as sw entities which may have an internal state and can interact with each other
- services are characterised by actions and atomic propositions of the form *type/name(interaction, corrTuple)*

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SocL actions

Actions ($a \in Act$)

have the form $t(i, c)$

- t : type of the action (e.g. *request*, *response*, *fail*, ...)
- i : name of the interaction which the action is part of (e.g. *charge*)
- c : tuple of correlation values and variables identifying the interaction; *var* denotes a binding occurrence of the correlation variable *var*

Examples

- $request(charge, 1234, 1)$: action starting an (instance of the) interaction *charge* which will be identified through the correlation tuple $\langle 1234, 1 \rangle$
a corresponding response action can be $response(charge, 1234, 1)$
- $request(charge, 1234, id)$: request action where the second correlation value is unknown; a (binder for a) correlation variable *id* is used instead
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the (free) occurrence of the correlation variable *id* indicates the connection with the action where the variable is bound

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SocL atomic propositions

Atomic propositions ($\pi \in AP$)

have the form $p(i, c)$

- p : name of the proposition (*accepting_request*, *accepting_cancel*, ...)
- i : name of the interaction (e.g. *charge*)
- c : tuple of correlation values and free variables

Examples

- *accepting_request(charge)*: proposition indicating that a state can accept requests for the interaction *charge* (regardless of the correlation data)
- *accepting_cancel(charge, 1234, 1)*: a state permits to cancel those requests for interaction *charge* identified by the correlation tuple $\langle 1234, 1 \rangle$

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SocL syntax

State formulae syntax

$$\phi ::= \text{true} \mid \pi \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi' \mid E\psi \mid A\psi$$

Path formulae syntax

$$\psi ::= X_\gamma\phi \mid \phi_x U_\gamma \phi' \mid \phi_x W_\gamma \phi'$$

Action formulae syntax

$$\gamma ::= \underline{a} \mid \chi \qquad \chi ::= tt \mid a \mid \tau \mid \neg\chi \mid \chi \wedge \chi$$

\underline{a} indicates that the action may contain variables binders

Some derived modalities

$\langle \gamma \rangle \phi$ stands for $EX_\gamma \phi$

$E(\phi_x U \phi')$ stands for $\phi' \vee E(\phi_x U_{\chi \vee \tau} \phi')$

$AF_\gamma \text{true}$ stands for $A(\text{true} \# U_\gamma \text{true})$

$[\gamma] \phi$ stands for $\neg \langle \gamma \rangle \neg \phi$

$EF\phi$ stands for $E(\text{true} \# U\phi)$

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E and A are existential and universal (resp.) *path quantifiers*

Action formulae syntax

$$\gamma ::= \underline{a} \mid x \qquad x ::= tt \mid a \mid \tau \mid \neg x \mid x \wedge x$$

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Path formulae syntax

$$\Psi ::= X_{\gamma}\phi \mid \phi_{\chi}U_{\gamma}\phi' \mid \phi_{\chi}W_{\gamma}\phi'$$

X , U and W are the *next*, (*strong*) *until* and *weak until* operators

- $X_{\gamma}\phi$ says that in the next state of the path, reached by an action satisfying γ , the formula ϕ holds
- $\phi_{\chi}U_{\gamma}\phi'$ says that ϕ' holds at some future state of the path reached by a last action satisfying γ , while ϕ holds from the current state until that state is reached and all the actions executed in the meanwhile along the path satisfy χ
- $\phi_{\chi}W_{\gamma}\phi'$ holds on a path either if the corresponding strong until operator holds or if for all the states of the path the formula ϕ holds and all the actions of the path satisfy χ

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- $\langle \gamma \rangle \phi$ states that it is *possible* to perform an action satisfying γ and thereby reaching a state that satisfies formula ϕ
- $[\gamma] \phi$ states that no matter how a process performs an action satisfying γ , the state it reaches in doing so will *necessarily* satisfy the formula ϕ
- $EF\phi$ means that there is some path that leads to a state at which ϕ holds; that is, ϕ *eventually* holds on some path
- $AF_{\gamma} \phi$ means that an action satisfying γ will be performed in the future along every path and at the reached states ϕ holds; if ϕ is *true*, we say that an action satisfying γ will *always eventually* be performed
- $AG\phi$ states that ϕ holds at every state on every path; that is, ϕ holds *globally*

Some derived modalities

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$E(\phi_x U \phi')$	stands for $\phi' \vee E(\phi_x U_{x \vee \tau} \phi')$	$EF\phi$	stands for $E(\text{true}_{tt} U \phi)$
$AF_{\gamma} \text{true}$	stands for $A(\text{true}_{tt} U_{\gamma} \text{true})$	$AG\phi$	stands for $\neg EF \neg \phi$

SocL description of abstract properties

Availability

the service is always capable to accept a request

$$AG(\text{accepting_request}(i))$$

Reliability

the service guarantees a successful response to each received request

$$AG[\text{request}(i, \underline{v})] AF_{\text{response}(i, \underline{v})} \text{ true}$$

Responsiveness

the service guarantees a response to each received request

$$AG[\text{request}(i, \underline{v})] AF_{\text{response}(i, \underline{v}) \vee \text{fail}(i, \underline{v})} \text{ true}$$

...

SocL semantics: action formulae semantics

$\alpha \models \gamma \triangleright \rho$ means: the formula γ is satisfied over the set of closed actions α under substitution ρ

- $\alpha \models \underline{a} \triangleright \rho$ iff $\exists b \in \alpha$ such that $\text{match}(\underline{a}, b) = \rho$
- $\alpha \models \chi \triangleright \emptyset$ iff $\alpha \models \chi$

where the relation $\alpha \models \chi$ is defined as follows

- ▶ $\alpha \models tt$ holds always
- ▶ $\alpha \models a$ iff $a \in \alpha$
- ▶ $\alpha \models \tau$ iff $\alpha = \emptyset$
- ▶ $\alpha \models \neg\chi$ iff not $\alpha \models \chi$
- ▶ $\alpha \models \chi \wedge \chi'$ iff $\alpha \models \chi$ and $\alpha \models \chi'$

SocL semantics

- Let $\langle Q, q_0, Act, R, AP, L \rangle$ be an L²TS, $q \in Q$ and $\sigma \in path(q)$
- The satisfaction relation of closed SocL formulae, i.e. formulae without unbound variables, is defined as follows

- $q \models true$ holds always
- $q \models \pi$ iff $\pi \in L(q)$
- $q \models \neg\phi$ iff not $q \models \phi$
- $q \models \phi \wedge \phi'$ iff $q \models \phi$ and $q \models \phi'$
- $q \models E\Psi$ iff $\exists \sigma \in path(q) : \sigma \models \Psi$
- $q \models A\Psi$ iff $\forall \sigma \in path(q) : \sigma \models \Psi$
- $\sigma \models X_\gamma\phi$ iff $\exists \rho : \sigma\{1\} \models \gamma \triangleright \rho$ and $\sigma(2) \models \phi \rho$
- ...


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- ...
- $\sigma \models \phi_x U_\gamma \phi'$ iff $\exists j \geq 1$
 $\sigma(j) \models \phi$, and $\exists \rho : \sigma\{j\} \models \gamma \triangleright \rho$ and $\sigma(j+1) \models \phi' \rho$,
and $\forall 1 \leq i < j : \sigma(i) \models \phi$ and $\sigma\{i\} \models \chi$
- $\sigma \models \phi_x W_\gamma \phi'$ iff either $\sigma \models \phi_x U_\gamma \phi'$ or $\forall i \geq 1 : \sigma(i) \models \phi$
and $\sigma\{i\} \models \chi$


A novel verification methodology of service properties

- 1 Properties are initially formalized as SocL formulae, while preserving their independence from individual service domains and specifications
- 2 Services behaviour are specified as COWS terms
- 3 Formulae are tailored to a given specification of a service by means of some abstraction rules that relate actions in the specification with actions of the logic
- 4 The verification process takes place




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
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We resort to a linguistic formalism rather than directly using L^2 TSs because


- L^2 TSs are too low level
- L^2 TSs suffer for lack of compositionality, i.e. they offer no means for constructing the L^2 TS of a composed service in terms of the L^2 TSs of its components
- linguistic terms are more intuitive and concise notations
- using linguistic terms, services are built in a compositional way
- linguistic terms are syntactically finite, even when the corresponding semantic model (i.e. L^2 TSs) is not

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


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
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The model checker CMC


To assist the verification process of SocL formulae over L^2TS

- CMC is an efficient on-the-fly model checker
- The basic idea behind CMC is that, given a state of an L^2TS , the validity of a SocL formula on that state can be established by:
 - ▶ checking the satisfiability of the state predicates
 - ▶ analyzing the transitions allowed in that state
 - ▶ establishing the validity of some subformula in some/all of the next reachable states
- If a SocL formula is not satisfied, a *counterexample* is exhibited

CMC can be used to verify properties of services specified in COWS

CMC can be downloaded or experimented via its web interface at <http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/cmc>

Model checking the bank service



Model checking the bank service

The instantiation of the generic patterns of formulae over the bank service is obtained by just replacing any occurrence of i with $charge$

The bank service is *always available*

$$AG(\text{accepting_request}(charge))$$

In every state the service may accept a request for the interaction $charge$

The bank service is *responsive*

$$AG[\text{request}(charge, \underline{v})] AF_{\text{response}(charge, v) \vee \text{fail}(charge, v)} \text{true}$$

The response and the failure notification belong to the same interaction $charge$ as the accepted request and they are correlated by the variable v

The bank service is *reliable*

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
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
Abstraction rules

Action	charge<*, *, *, \$id>	→	request(charge, \$id)
Action	resp<\$id, "ok">	→	response(charge, \$id)
Action	resp<\$id, "fail">	→	fail(charge, \$id)
State	charge	→	accepting_request(charge)

Tool demonstration . . .

Model checking: a calculus-based approach

We have seen a calculus-based methodology for model checking COWS specifications




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This may not be the case, especially within

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
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Just an example...



Verification
results


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
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
UML4SOA

- The most widely used language for modelling sw systems is UML
- UML4SOA is a UML 2.0 profile, inspired by WS-BPEL, that has been expressly designed for modeling service-oriented applications
- UML4SOA activity diagrams express the behavioral aspects of services
 - ▶ integrate UML with specialized actions for exchanging messages, specialized structured activity nodes and activity edges for representing scopes with event, fault and compensation handlers
- Since UML4SOA specifications are static models, they are not suitable for direct automated analysis


UML4SOA: diagram example




How to reconcile




UML4SOA
diagrams




How to reconcile



Our proposal



Our proposal




Our proposal

Venus: a Verification Environment for UML models of Services

A software environment for verifying behavioural properties of UML models of services by exploiting process calculi and temporal logics

- UML models of services: UMLSOA activity diagrams
- Venus shepherds the (non-expert) users to set the behavioural service properties they want to verify
- It is a proof-of-concept implementation




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


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


Our proposal


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
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
Bank scenario: bank service



Bank scenario: credit rating service



Bank scenario: client service







Venus demo 2/16




Venus demo 3/16




Venus demo 4/16




Venus demo 5/16




Venus demo 6/16



Venus demo 7/16



Venus demo 8/16



Venus demo 9/16

Venus - A Verification Environment for UML Models of Services

File ?

Specification Properties Abstraction Verification

Associate the relevant operations to their intuitive semantics in terms of abstract actions


Verify

For each action (request/responseOk/...) specify the corresponding operation(s) in the specification:


Service Request:	charge_r3	-- correlation --	Add
	-- operation --		
Positive Response:	charge_r3	-- correlation --	Add
	chargeOK_s1		
Negative Response:	checkFail_s1	-- correlation --	Add
	check_s3		
	chargeOK_r1		
	chargeFail_s1		

Expert users can directly specify operation-action associations:


Venus demo 10/16




Venus demo 11/16




Venus demo 12/16




Venus demo 13/16



Venus demo 14/16



Venus demo 15/16



Venus demo 16/16

Venus - A Verification Environment for UML Models of Services

File ?

Specification Properties Abstraction Verification

Check the validity of the properties


```
AG [ request(charge,$var) ] AF { responseOk(charge,$var) } true
is FOUND_FALSE in State C1
```

-- AVAILABLE --
AG AF (accepting_request(charge))


-- RESPONSIVE --
AG [request(charge,\$var)]

-- RELIABLE --
AG [request(charge,\$var)]





Venus architecture




Venus architecture



From UML4SOA to cows



From UML4SOA to cows



$[r, stack]$
 $([k] (GRAPH ; \{c \bullet main? \langle \rangle . GRAPH_c \}$
 $| \{Stack\} | * GRAPH_{ev})$
 $| r? \langle \rangle . \{GRAPH_e \}$



$\llcompensate\gg$
main $\rightarrow c \bullet main! \langle \rangle$

$\llraise\gg$
abort $\rightarrow kill(k) | \{r! \langle \rangle \}$

$\llcompensate\ all\ \gg$ $\rightarrow stack \bullet compAll! \langle \rangle$

Our COWS implementation of UML4SOA constructs follows a compositional approach

From UML4SOA to cows



Our COWS implementation of UML4SOA constructs follows a compositional approach

Concluding remarks

Conclusions

- COWS permits modelling different and typical aspects of services and Web services technologies
 - ▶ multiple start activities, receive conflicts, routing of correlated messages, service instances and interactions among them
- COWS can express the most common workflow patterns and can encode many other process and orchestration languages
- COWS, with some mild linguistic additions, can model all the relevant phases of the life cycle of service-oriented applications
 - ▶ publication, discovery, negotiation, deployment, orchestration, reconfiguration and execution

Conclusions

- The observational semantics permits to check interchangeability of services and conformance against service specifications
- The type system permits specifying and forcing policies for constraining the services that can safely access any given datum
 - ▶ Types are just sets and operations on types are union, intersection, subset inclusion, . . .
 - ▶ The runtime semantics only involves efficiently implementable operations on sets
- The logical verification framework for checking functional properties of SOC applications has many advantages
 - ▶ It can be easily tailored to other service-oriented specification languages
 - ▶ SocL's parametric formulae permit expressing properties about many kinds of interaction patterns, e.g. *one-way*, *request-response*, *one request-multiple responses*, . . .



<http://rap.dsi.unifi.it/cows/>

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